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Primates recognize objects in natural
visual scenes with great rapidity. The ven-
tral visual cortex is usually assumed to
play a major role in this ability (“high-
road”). However, the “low-road” alterna-
tive frequently proposed is that the visual
cortex is bypassed by a rapid subcortical
route to the amygdala, especially in the
case of biologically relevant and emotional
stimuli. This paper highlights the lack of
evidence from psychophysics and compu-
tational models to support this “low-road”
alternative. Most importantly, the timing
of neural responses invites a serious recon-
sideration of the low-road role in rapid
processing of visual objects.
THE SPEED OF SIGHT
The rapid and accurate processing of
complex visual scenes has been demon-
strated by Thorpe and colleagues using
the rapid visual categorization protocol
(Thorpe et al., 1996), in which participants
reported the presence of animals in natural
scenes as soon as 250ms after image onset.
This result sets strong time constraints
on the neural mechanisms underlying
object categorization. Diagnostic category
information might actually be available
even earlier, since selective eye move-
ment responses can be produced only
100–120ms after stimulus onset (Kirchner
and Thorpe, 2006; Crouzet et al., 2010).
What neural mechanisms could account
for such rapid vision?
THE CORTICAL “HIGH-ROAD”
A widely held view is that object
recognition results from the interplay
of hierarchically organized areas
along the ventral visual stream
(Dicarlo et al., 2012)—running from the
primary visual cortex (V1) through extras-
triate visual areas (V2 and V4), to the
inferotemporal cortex (IT) where high-
level visual representations are encoded.
To reconcile this view with the short
behavioral latencies observed in rapid
categorization tasks, several authors have
suggested that a pure feedforward sweep of
activity through the ventral stream might
be sufficient to perform core object recog-
nition (Thorpe et al., 1996; Serre et al.,
2007b).
THE SUBCORTICAL “LOW-ROAD”
On the other hand, a subcortical
shortcut—the so-called “low-road”—
might seem to be a plausible alternative.
This hypothesis finds its origin in the rapid
amygdala responses reported by (LeDoux,
1996) during auditory fear conditioning.
In a series of experiments in rodents, he
delineated a quick route that bypasses
the cortex by directly reaching the amyg-
dala via the thalamus. Such a subcortical
shortcut would, in specific cases such as
threatening situations, enable the rapid
initiation of appropriate defense responses
even before the sensory cortices become
involved. Furthermore, since the amygdala
has been linked to emotion recognition
(particularly fear) in humans (Adolphs
et al., 1994), this alternative pathway was
proposed as an explanation for rapid,
automatic, and unconscious reactions
among humans and monkeys to biologi-
cally relevant visual stimuli (Öhman and
Mineka, 2001; Johnson, 2005; Öhman,
2005; Vuilleumier, 2005; Tamietto et al.,
2009; Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010; de
Gelder et al., 2011).
Here we argue that there is no con-
vincing evidence in support of the “low-
road” theory when extended to rapid
visual object processing in primates. To
preface our arguments, first, real-world
object categorization requires computa-
tional properties that have not yet been
found in a subcortical pathway (see “Real-
world Recognition Requires Selectivity
and Invariance”). Second, among the
characteristics attributed to the “low-
road,” we argue that genuine rapidity has
not yet been demonstrated appropriately
(see “What is Rapid Visual Processing?”).
Finally, we will demonstrate how the low-
road hypothesis is at odds with neural
latencies reported in the amygdala and
the visual cortex (see “Ventral Stream
Visual Cortex is Activated Before the
Amygdala”). Altogether, these arguments
point to an earlier role for cortical areas
and suggest a serious reconsideration
of the role of the “low-road” in rapid
vision.
REAL-WORLD RECOGNITION REQUIRES
SELECTIVITY AND INVARIANCE
To support recognition, a neural system
needs to reach a high level of selectivity
while dealing with the inherent variabil-
ity of sensory input. This balance between
selectivity and invariance is a hallmark
feature of visual recognition in primates,
and remains a challenge for computer
vision.
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In macaque monkeys, selective neural
responses to complex objects are typically
found in the IT (Dicarlo et al., 2012).
These neuronal responses are also toler-
ant to changes in retinal position, scale,
or pose of the object (Hung et al., 2005).
Studies using intracranial recordings in
human epileptic patients have also shown
that neural responses from the visual cor-
tex provide a categorical signal tolerant to
changes in scale and position (Liu et al.,
2009).
Driven by results from electrophysi-
ology, a plausible model of how selec-
tivity and invariance could be built
through the ventral stream has emerged.
It is based on two successive operations,
template-matching and non-linear pool-
ing, repeated at each stage of the ventral
hierarchy (Serre et al., 2007b). Such hier-
archical models have been shown to accu-
rately mimic primate rapid categorization
performance (Serre et al., 2007b; Crouzet
and Serre, 2011) and neural responses
of the visual ventral stream (Serre et al.,
2007a).
Among subcortical structures, human
single-unit studies showed that the amyg-
dala contains neurons selective to cate-
gories or objects such as animals, famous
faces, or places (Kreiman et al., 2000;
Quiroga et al., 2005; Mormann et al.,
2011). Interestingly, these neurons are
highly invariant since they respond to var-
ious pictures of their preferential objects,
but also to their written or spoken names.
However, there is currently no model
of how this high level of both selectiv-
ity and invariance could be built from a
direct subcortical route. A more reason-
able assumption would thus be that it gets
its input from high-level areas of the ven-
tral stream, rather than from the thalamus
(shortcut “low-road” route).
WHAT IS RAPID VISUAL PROCESSING?
Numerous studies investigated affective
stimulus processing with short image pre-
sentation and masking protocols to show
that emotions such as fear can be pro-
cessed unconsciously and “rapidly” (Bar
et al., 2006; Öhman et al., 2007; Adolphs,
2008). While there is no doubt that mask-
ing is a powerful experimental tool to
reveal unconscious sensory processing, it
does not provide information on the
genuine rapidity of visual processing. In
backward masking protocols, the stimu-
lus onset asynchrony (SOA, time interval
between target and mask onset) is a mea-
sure of the visual uptake time (or tempo-
ral resolution), not of the time required
for complete visual processing. In other
words, even in a perfect pipeline model
of the visual system, the mask interfer-
ence would only give information about
the time spent at each stage, and not
about the cumulative time for all stages
(Vanrullen, 2011). For example, the fact
that fear information can be extracted
from faces masked after an SOA of 39ms
(Bar et al., 2006) informs us about the
minimal visual uptake time necessary for
fear processing but does not say any-
thing about the time at which fear infor-
mation is available to trigger behavioral
responses.
The speed of processing for object
or scene categorization has been exten-
sively studied using rapid categorization
protocols. Using minimal reaction time
measurements (the time at which correct
responses start to significantly outnum-
ber incorrect ones) it has been shown that
humans can categorize images as contain-
ing an animal in only 250ms (Thorpe
et al., 1996), while monkeys can per-
form the same task by 180ms (Fabre-
Thorpe et al., 1998). Even faster, reliable
saccades toward faces and animals can
be triggered as soon as 100–120ms after
image onset (Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006;
Crouzet et al., 2010). As far as we know,
there is no evidence for faster processing of
emotional stimuli, as would be predicted
by the “low-road” hypothesis.
VENTRAL STREAM VISUAL CORTEX IS
ACTIVATED BEFORE THE AMYGDALA
Most of the studies on humans inves-
tigating the role of the amygdala in
visual processing used fMRI and PET
scans (Morris et al., 1999; Whalen et al.,
2004; see Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010 and
Vuilleumier, 2005 for reviews). These two
techniques, because of their poor tempo-
ral resolution, do not allow conclusions
about the temporal dynamics of stimulus
processing. Despite this limitation, it was
assumed that amygdala responses to emo-
tional stimuli, notably to fear-inducing
stimuli, were based on a rapid low-road
activation (Öhman and Mineka, 2001;
Vuilleumier, 2005).
A review of electrophysiological studies
reporting neural latencies suggests a clearly
different picture. Many studies investi-
gating the properties of IT cells have
reported selective responses to shapes,
faces or object categories occurring as
soon as 70–100ms after stimulus onset
(Perrett et al., 1982; Li et al., 1993; Tovee
et al., 1994; Liu and Richmond, 2000;
Hung et al., 2005; see Mormann et al.,
2008 for a review). Similarly, in human
epileptic patients, IFP recorded from the
occipito-temporal cortex were object cat-
egory selective as early as 100ms after
stimulus onset (Liu et al., 2009). These
category selective latencies are compati-
ble with the rapid behavioral responses
observed in natural scene categorization
tasks (Thorpe et al., 1996; Fabre-Thorpe
et al., 1998; Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006;
Girard et al., 2008). Furthermore, this
early ventral stream activity has been
shown to be causally linked with behav-
ioral responses in monkeys (Afraz et al.,
2006) and humans (Pitcher et al., 2007;
Sadeh et al., 2011).
On the other hand, selective responses
to visual features or objects in mon-
keys’ amygdala tend to have a greater
time-lapse (Gothard et al., 2007). One
single-unit study (Leonard et al., 1985)
compared the two pathways directly (on
the same monkeys) and showed that
neurons in the STS (superior tempo-
ral sulcus, top of the ventral stream)
had latencies (90–140ms) that systemat-
ically preceded those from the amygdala
(110–200ms). In humans, two intracranial
recording studies have tested the exis-
tence of rapid amygdala responses to emo-
tional stimuli. But the earliest responses
were reported at 200ms (Krolak-Salmon
et al., 2004) and 250–500ms (Rutishauser
et al., 2011), which is much slower
than the fast occipito-temporal selectivity
reported for objects categories (Liu et al.,
2009). Moreover, the amygdala responses
observed for emotional stimuli were not
occurring earlier than what is generally
reported for object categories (Mormann
et al., 2008). Among the medial tempo-
ral lobe structures (i.e., perirhinal cor-
tex, entorhinal cortex, hippocampus, and
amygdala), the amygdala is actually the
one with the slowest visual responses
(average latencies of 271ms in the perirhi-
nal cortex for example). The pattern of
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neural latencies observed in both human
and monkeys thus clearly vouches for a
cortical “high-road” precedence.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we questioned the hypothesis
that a subcortical low-road could account
for the speed of sight. Several observations
from psychophysics, computational mod-
eling, and electrophysiology strongly sug-
gest that the low-road account is mostly
incompatible with the characteristics of
rapid visual categorization. On the con-
trary, a large collection of evidence con-
firms that the cortical high-road, through
the visual ventral stream, can accomplish
a rapid, selective, and invariant analysis of
the scene. The latency of neural visual acti-
vation and response characteristics in the
amygdala clearly suggest that its involve-
ment in visual processing is downstream of
the ventral visual cortex, after core object
recognition has been performed.
Thus, contrary to what is commonly
acknowledged, rapid, and automatic pro-
cessing of visual objects is likely to be
under cortical-dependence while subcorti-
cal structures would be involved in slower
(probably higher-level) processing. This
conclusion conforms with recent results
and reviews pointing out the unexpected
role of subcortical structure in high cog-
nitive functions (Parvizi, 2009). Amygdala
for instance is now thought to play a major
role in the evaluation of the biological sig-
nificance of stimuli (Pessoa and Adolphs,
2010) and the pulvinar, showing dense
connection with many cortical areas, has
recently been shown to play a role in regu-
lating information transmission across the
visual cortex (Saalmann et al., 2012).
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